Credit risk management in Italy is characterized, in the period June 2008 -June 2012, by frequent (frequency=0.5 cycles/year) and intense (peak amplitude: mean=39.2 b€; s.e.=2.83 b€) quarterly contractions and expansions around the mean (915.4 b€; s.e.=3.59 b€) of the nominal total credit used by non-financial corporations. Such frequent and intense fluctuations are frequently ascribed to exogenous Basel II procyclical effects on credit flow into the economy and, consequently, Basel III output-based point-in-time Credit/GDP countercyclical buffering advocated. We have tested the opposite null hypotheses that such variation is significantly correlated to actual default rates, and that such correlation is explained by fluctuations of credit supply around a steady state. We have found that, in the period June 2008 -June 2012 (n=17), linear regression of credit growth rates on default rates reveals a negative correlation of r=−.6903 with R 2 =.4765, and that credit supply fluctuates steadily around the default rate with an Internal Steady State Parameter SSP=.00245 with 2 =37.47 (v=16, P<.005). We conclude that fluctuations of the total credit used by non-financial corporations are exhaustively explained by variation of the independent variable "default rate", and that credit variation fluctuates around a steady state. We conclude that credit risk management in Italy has been effective in parameterizing credit supply variation to default rates within the Basel II operating framework. Basel III prospective countercyclical point-in-time output buffers based on filtered Credit/GDP ratios and dynamic provisioning proposals should take into account this underlying steady state statistical pattern.
Background
Credit risk management has become one of the most relevant topics both for financial institutions and for scholars. Credit risk models have evolved from subjective analysis to accounting-based creditscoring systems and measures of credit risk and risk concentration (Altman and Saunders, 1998) and their effects on capital allocation and shareholders' value in banking assessed (Resti and Sironi 2012) .
The European Commission with the Credit Risk Directives (CRD I, II and III) and Banking
Authorities with Basel Accords on minimum capital requirements and countercyclical buffers (Basel II and III) are still carrying out a long process of formalization of credit risk management methods and guidelines in order to diffuse a culture of common rules at the continental level.
Monitoring, data collecting and analysis of economic and financial cyclicality is coordinated in the EU by Eurostat, with cyclical indicators 1 such as the Business Climate Indicator (BCI), the OECD Composite Leading Indicators (CLI), the Ifo Economic Climate Indicator, the DZ Euroland, the IARC,
IESR and E-Coin published quarterly by Eurostatistics.
Eurostat has developed and implemented a set of guidelines for the statistical analysis of cyclical fluctuations (2003) and modern statistical tools (Sigma 2009 ) to which we will refer in full 2 .
As far as banks' regulatory capital is concerned, procyclicality, and the potential effects of capital requirements standards on the flow of credit into the economy, have been addressed by the Basel II Committee and Italy's Central Bank (Banca d'Italia) 3 which recommended to use long term data horizons to estimate probabilities of default (PD) 4 , to introduce a downturn loss-given-default (LGD) estimate 5 and to introduce expected long-run loss rates (EL) in AIRB methods 6 . Basel II accords require own estimates of PD and LGD to be no less than the long-run default-weighted average loss rate given default calculated based on the average economic loss of all observed defaults within the data source for that type of facility 7 . Coherently, the introduction of point-in-time output buffers based on a Hodrick-Prescott filter of the macroeconomic Credit-to-GDP gap 8 to reduce procyclicality during periods of excessive credit growth and promote countercyclical dampening during periods of contraction is among the main goals of the ongoing Basel III reform 9 . 12 In a discrete distribution a maximum is determined when y(t)>y(t-1) and y(t)>y(t+1), a minimum when y(t)<y(t-1) and y(t)<y(t+1) and a steady state when y(t)=y(t-1) and/or y(t)=y(t+1). 13 
Research Questions and Methods
In this paper we have asked two research questions:
Q1 -is there a statistically significant linear relationship linking credit output fluctuations to default rates in the period June 2008 -June 2012? We argue that if such a linear relationship does exist or, in other words, if variation in credit supply is satisfactorily explained by independent variation in the default rates then, given the a priori postulate that exogenous macro-conditions, such as the business cycle, do affect default rates, and Basel II minimum capital requirements do have procyclical effects, then such exogenous effects are satisfactorily transformed by the relationship between credit and default rates, as it should be according to operating Basel II Accords; Q2 -given that Q1 linear relationship does exist, can we formulate a null hypothesis regarding the causes of such relationship which can be statistically analyzed and tested? In particular we will test the hypothesis that credit supply variation systematically converges towards a steady state, i.e. credit supply is systematically increased or decreased in order to achieve credit steady state at a definite level parameterized by a steady state parameter.
We have analyzed Italy's Central Bank Statistical Bulletin's quarterly default rates for loan facilities Calculation) 14 which, as we will see, will determine, in our case, the Internal Steady State Parameter Ϛ (little sigma) of the system.
An epidemic reaches a steady state when:
where we have defined the variable f as: 14 See also Backward Calculation in Eurostat (2003); 3.2 f = The credit growth rate determined as
The credit growth rate is asymptotically equal to the amount of loan facilities disbursed in period t,t+n divided by the total credit used at the beginning t of the period which will survive (1-d) to the end t+n of such period. The variable f assumes that the credit risk manager possesses perfect information regarding d and therefore will not grant new loans or additional loans L to borrowers which he knows will default in the same period; δ = The sliding time parameter δ accounts for the fact that the nearer the credit risk manager gets retrospectively to time t+n , the more perfect information becomes and thus the retrospective forecast. In the quarterly data analyzed we have assumed δ=0, i.e. the credit risk manager has at time t perfect information regarding default rates and credit growth rates regarding the period t,t+n.
We have assumed an LGD=1; the hypothesis is reasonable in the framework of the analysis since recovery rates affect, at time of recovery, the credit supply to the economy, and such effect will be "seen" in the total credit used and in the credit growth rate.
We can now formulate the null hypotheses that:
Q1:
: credit supply growth is a dependent variable explained by a negative linear relationship with the independent default rate;
Q2:
: credit supply growth or decline rate is explained by odds of default, i.e. the ratio between the default rate and the survival rate. In alternative, we will test the hypothesis that credit supply growth or decline rate is not explained by the odds of default alone and is sensitive to exogenous cyclical positive or negative factors, which we will define as the Steady State Parameter Ϛ of the system. There follows that
We have utilized Mathematica 8 and Statistical-Graphical Integration with Mac OS X Datagraph 3.1.
Findings
We have divided the Credit Supply Growth Rates (f) and the Default Rates P<.005). We conclude that fluctuations of the total credit used by non-financial corporations are exhaustively explained by variation of the independent variable "default rate", and that credit variation fluctuates around a steady state. We conclude that credit risk management in Italy has been effective in parameterizing credit supply variation to default rates within the Basel II operating framework. Basel III prospective countercyclical point-in-time output buffers based on filtered Credit/GDP ratios and dynamic provisioning proposals should take into account this underlying steady state statistical pattern.
Limits
As Gordy (2003) observes credit risk is idiosyncratic to the obligor, and what we define a cycle is really a composite of a multiplicity of cycles tied to location, period and sector. Therefore this model suffers form the same limits as the Credit/GDP countercyclical buffers, i.e. a single-factor model cannot capture any clustering of default rates due to dishomogeneous sensitivity to smaller-scale components of the macro cycle.
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